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SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE 
PARADOX OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
Nan D. Hunter* 
In Lawrence v. Texas,1 the Supreme Court performed a double 
move, creating a dramatic discursive moment: it both decriminalized 
consensual homosexual relations between adults, and, simultaneously, 
authorized a new regime of heightened regulation of homosexuality. 
How that happened and what we can expect next are the subjects of 
this essay. 
The obvious point of departure for an analysis of Lawrence is its 
decriminalization of much sexual conduct. Justice Scalia began this 
project with his dire warning that "[s]tate laws against bigamy, same­
sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, 
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are . . .  sustainable only in light of 
Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices."2 Justice Scalia 
correctly predicts that laws against fornication are now a dead letter;3 
there are no laws against masturbation, so his worries there are 
unnecessary.4 But the judicial processes for evaluating laws prohibiting 
other sexual conduct will constitute one major segment of the overall 
process that will construct the next chapter of sexuality law. 
Sodomy law operated as both a mechanism of subordination and a 
metaphor of heterosexual superiority.5 Decriminalization is not 
deregulation, however. Nor is it a marker of full equality. Rather, it is 
one stage in a regulatory process, one likely to produce even more 
"institutional incitement to speak about [sex], and to do so more and 
more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it 
spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation 
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., 
Georgetown University Law Center. I appreciate the research assistance of Robin 
Fukuyama and Emily Kern, editorial suggestions by Anne Kanyusik of the Michigan Law 
Review, and the support of Brooklyn Law School's program of summer research stipends. 
1. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
2. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 10-13. 
4. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage, SUP. Cf. REV. (forthcoming 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=450160 (Sept. 2003). 
5. For an extensive analysis of the direct and indirect effects of sodomy law, see 
Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy 
Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000). 
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and endlessly accumulated detail."6 State involvement with sexuality 
has not ended, and Lawrence poses an implicit question: How will the 
discursive policing of homosexuality change in the wake of this 
decision? 7 
Legal disputes will likely center on the extent to which the indirect 
mechanisms operating in fields such as family and employment law 
will supplant criminal law in state regulation of homosexuality. 
Lawrence deprives the government of easy invocations of morals or 
tradition to justify regulation. Courts will have to engage in more 
particularized assessments of whether legitimate state interests justify 
classifications based on sexual orientation: judges will have to hear 
homosexuality spoken about even more frequently, and, in order to do 
their jobs, will have to cause it to speak. 
The threshold question in such inquiries will be determining the 
correct standard of review. Courts may be reluctant to test sexual 
orientation classifications by the same stringent criteria that they apply 
under the upper tiers of Equal Protection review, but the extreme 
deference of old-fashioned rational basis review has now been 
complicated by the Court's recognition that at least some adverse 
treatment of gay people is invidious and disfavored. Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests that there are two tiers of 
rational basis review as well, something the Court intimated but did 
not make explicit in Romer v. Evans.8 
Whatever standard of review the courts apply, the inquiries into 
the reasonableness of differentiating based on sexual orientation will 
become more detailed and contextual. This aspect of "heightened 
scrutiny" reflects the fact that juridical discourse on sexuality always 
has two focuses: examination of the legitimacy of governmental 
actions and, often sub silentio, examination of the social acceptability 
of those persons who are the objects of the government's 
interventions. I use the phrase "heightened scrutiny" here to refer not 
to the standard hierarchy of levels of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but to surface this second, implicit meaning of the 
phrase. The paradox of this form of heightened scrutiny is that such 
6. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 18 (Robert Hurley trans., 
Vintage Books 1990) (1976). 
7. Throughout this article, I refer solely to gay and lesbian persons, not to other sexual 
minorities, because homosexuality was the focus of the Court's opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas. I expect, and hope, that transgendered people will also be able to invoke the Court's 
recognition that the government should not demean and disrespect its citizens based on 
harmless varieties of sexual self-representation. But a full explication of that set of issues is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 
F.3d 752, 768 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting) (" '[R]ationality' in the law of equal 
protection is not in fact a single standard, though the courts have been coy about admitting 
this."). 
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examinations will constitute even greater state intrusion than occurred 
under the old criminal law regime, a development which seems the 
antithesis of the Lawrence Court's expansion of liberty. 
I. THE LAW OF LAWRENCE 
In Lawrence v. Texas,9 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas 
criminal statute that prohibited oral or anal sex between two persons 
of the same sex. In so doing, the Court held that the liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause extends to adults "deciding how 
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."1 0 Although 
it requires some effort to articulate precisely what standard of review 
the Court deployed in its analysis,1 1  there is no question that, whatever 
test it used, the Court eradicated the last vestiges of state power to 
criminalize private consensual adult sexual behavior solely on the 
basis of morality, without any showing of harm either to persons or to 
legally protected institutions. 
To understand the extent to which the Court jettisoned morality 
qua morality as a legitimate justification, one can compare the 
decision in Lawrence to that of the Kentucky Supreme Court in 
Commonwealth v. Wasson,12 which also invalidated a law, essentially 
identical to the Texas statute, that prohibited sodomy only between 
same-sex partners. Relying on state constitutional provisions 
protecting liberty and equality, the Kentucky court did not bar 
legislative reliance on morality as a justification for criminalization of 
private adult consensual sexual conduct. Instead, the court held that a 
moral justification could only be legitimate if the same standard 
applied to all citizens, not just to lesbians and gay men.1 3 But the 
Kentucky court did not question the legitimacy of a morality 
justification for the prohibition of sodomy. 
A holding such as that of the Kentucky court in Wasson - with its 
deference to legislated morality so long as it was evenhanded - was 
all that the Supreme Court in Lawrence had to adopt in order to strike 
down the Texas law. It is telling that the majority specifically 
9. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
10. Id. at 2480. 
1 1. My view on this question is that a majority of the Court coalesced behind an 
approach described most elaborately in Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). See Nan D. Hunter, Living 
with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103 (2004). 
12. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). 
13. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 499-500. Of course, for equality protections to be meaningful, 
even facially neutral statutes must be enforced and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. 
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eschewed this course.14 Instead, the Court rejected morality alone as a 
sufficient ground for prohibiting consensual sexual conduct. 
Other opinions in Lawrence also undercut the morality defense. 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which did rely on Equal 
Protection grounds, rejected the most traditional use of morality 
rationales by noting that laws embodying moral disapproval of a group 
of persons could not pass a rational basis test.15 Even Justice Thomas's 
terse dissent, with its characterization of sodomy prohibitions as 
"uncommonly silly," suggested that he personally found the morality 
arguments unpersuasive, even though he believed that the judiciary 
was constrained not to second-guess a legislature's use of them.16 
Thus, Lawrence proffers a critically important new principle: 
untethered to some objective, material referent, morality alone cannot 
justify deprivation of liberty. But exactly what this abstract declaration 
will mean in practice is anything but clear. 
Most of the impact of the now extinct sodomy laws had already 
crossed the borders of criminal law prior to Lawrence. As the Court 
noted, criminalization invites "discrimination both in the public and in 
the private spheres."1 7 Prior to Lawrence, courts had routinely 
accepted that invitation. Reasoning from the holding of Bowers v. 
Hardwick,18 the judiciary developed what I have called the categorical 
inequality principle, ruling that because gay people presumptively 
violated criminal prohibitions against sodomy, the government could 
properly deny them employment or custody or visitation rights with 
their children.19 
Categorical inequality based on sodomy laws has now ended. 
Despite the Court's strong rhetoric of respect and dignity as to gay 
lives, 20 however, the Lawrence opinion does not fully answer the 
equality question of when and under what circumstances the law must, 
to use Justice O'Connor's phrase, treat gay people "in the same 
manner as everyone else. "21 
Instead, mixed in with the language of liberty, the Lawrence text 
contains a series of verbal gestures toward possibilities of regulation. 
In addition to a list of situations not covered by its holding,22 the Court 
14. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480. 
15. Id. at 2486. 
16. Id. at 2498. 
17. Id. at 2482. 
18. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
19. Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 89 KY. L.J. 8
.
85, 893-95 
(2000-01). 
20. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478, 2482, 2484. 
21. Id. at 2486. 
22. The Lawrence Court stated: 
1532 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 102:1528 
in Lawrence explicitly left open the question of whether same-sex 
personal relationships are "entitled to formal recognition in the law."2 3  
Consider the many aspects of family law, other than marriage, that 
courts deliberating on whether to accord "formal recognition in the 
law" to gay couples will have to address: eligibility for adoption, 
taxability of assets and income, immigration status, standing to seek 
redress for certain torts, entitlement to family leave and other 
employment benefits, and many others. Is "recognition" a positive or 
a negative liberty? If "formal recognition" entails some affirmative 
extension of benefits, can we infer that the liberty right precludes the 
imposition of penalties based on those relationships? If so, how does 
one draw the line between benefits denied and penalties imposed? Is 
there any disadvantage that the state can lawfully impose on non­
commercial, consensual adult sexual conduct that occurs in private? 24 
It is striking that in the first year after the Lawrence majority 
authored the grand language of its opinion, appellate courts upheld 
three forms of stark antigay discrimination. In Standhart v. Superior 
Court of Maricopa County,25 the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that 
the state could bar gay couples from marriage, on the ground that a 
rational relationship existed between the legal definition of marriage 
as limited to male-female unions and the state's legitimate interest in 
"ensuring responsible procreation within committed, long-term 
relationships."26 In State v. Limon,27 the Kansas Court of Appeals 
upheld a seventeen-year sentence for an eighteen-year-old male who 
engaged in oral sex with a fourteen-year-old male, despite the fact that 
the maximum sentence would have been slightly more than one year 
had one of them been female. In Lofton v. Secretary of Department of 
Children and Family Services,28 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld a Florida statute prohibiting gay people from 
adopting children, on the ground that the legislature could rationally 
decide that a policy favoring married couples and single heterosexuals 
furthered the state's goal of promoting healthy sexual development in 
children. Lawrence had surprisingly little impact on the outcome in 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured 
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It 
does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government 
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. 
Id. at 2484. 
23. Id. at 2478. 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
26. Standhart, 77 P.3d at 463. 
27. 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). 
28. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), reh'g denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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any of these decisions. Of the nine appellate judges who interpreted 
Lawrence in its first year, only one dissented from upholding these 
statutes. 29 
The importance of these particular rulings may fade with time; 
future courts may reject any or all of them. What is important is not 
what they stand for as propositions of law, but what they tell us about 
the possible limits of Lawrence.30 Their significance lies in how they 
exemplify the patterns and structure of the reasoning that courts may 
use in a post-sodomy-law world. 
One pattern that these early cases illustrate is that because the 
concept of homosexuality as a benign variation has not yet achieved 
widespread cultural acceptance, the question of whether 
homosexuality actually causes harm in any given situation has no easy 
resolution. Gay-rights advocates and opponents will have to offer 
proof as to the existence of any asserted harms. 31 Courts will decide 
fewer cases on motions to dismiss, and more litigation will involve 
factual disputes, although often concerning evidence of societal 
patterns as well as individualized situations. Contexts will vary widely, 
from those involving young children in the care of gay people, to 
anonymous or semi-anonymous sexual encounters, to individuals 
seeking positions of significant power or public esteem. In each 
context, courts will struggle with how to assess what role, if any, 
homosexuality should play in the official policies of the state or in the 
practices of private entities. 
In the most significant victory for gay rights advocates since 
Lawrence, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health struck down that state's ban on marriage 
by same-sex couples. 3 2  The court's majority ruled that the exclusion 
violates the state constitution as a matter of law.3 3 By contrast, two of 
the three dissents relied heavily on social science evidence regarding 
the effects on children of having been raised by same-sex partners, a 
body of research which they found inconclusive in establishing the 
absence of harm. 34 
29. Judge Pierron of the Kansas Court of Appeals dissented in Limon. 83 P.3d at 243 
(Pierron, J., dissenting). 
30. Similarly, the earliest post-Brown decisions are now forgotten. But they foretold 
subsequent flashpoints in the civil rights movement. See, e.g., Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 
776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (interpreting Brown to mean that the Constitution "does not 
require integration [of public schools) . . . .  It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as 
the result of voluntary action."). 
31. Suzanne Goldberg characterizes this as the shift from philosophical to empirical 
bases for morality arguments. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for 
Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004). 
32. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
33. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
34. Id. at 979-80, 998-99 & nn.23-27. 
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This is not to suggest that an intense engagement with facts 
operates to the disadvantage of equality advocates. In defending its 
law, Massachusetts relied on essentially the same arguments and kinds 
of proof as the state of Hawaii had used ten years earlier. On remand 
from the Hawaii Supreme Court, which ruled that the state had to 
demonstrate a compelling interest behind barring same-sex couples 
from marriage,35 evidence at trial focused on child-rearing practices 
and outcomes in gay families.36 The court ruled that the state had 
failed to satisfy its burden of proof.37 With the debates over marriage 
likely to be replicated for years in various venues, we can expect to see 
such factual contests multiply. Indeed, with the elimination of morality 
alone as an acceptable legislative goal, both advocates for and 
opponents of marriage equality will intensify their focus on the 
construction of facts. 
The result may be, certainly should be, far more victories by 
lesbian and gay litigants seeking equal rights and benefits in all these 
realms. However, the result will not be expanded liberty in the sense 
of less involvement by the state. The state, especially through its 
judicial and social service arms, will be more, not less, involved with 
the regulation of homosexuality. In each contested arena and even for 
each barrier to equality that falls, new principles will emerge to govern 
the relationship between the state and sexual orientation. 
II. THE PARADOX OF LA WREN CE 
The hidden message of Lawrence is that, despite the Supreme 
Court's proclamation of a zone of liberty "where the State should not 
be a dominant presence,"38 the role of the state in regulating 
homosexuality, both positively and negatively, will likely increase 
rather than decrease. As the early cases discussed in the preceding 
section indicate, assessing which state policies and private practices 
concerning homosexuality are lawful will require more, not less, 
judicial scrutiny. This new form of heightened scrutiny will entail more 
precise and detailed judicial inquiries into whether such policies and 
practices have legitimate justifications, beyond mere invocation of 
moral conventions. 
One important effect of the categorical inequality principle 
characteristic of the Hardwick regime was that it eliminated the need 
35. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In 1998, however, the Hawaii Constitution 
was amended to empower the state legislature "to reserve marriage to opposite-sex 
couples." HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23. 
36. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *4-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
37. Id. at *21. 
38. 123 S. Ct. at 2475. 
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to delve into those questions. A belief that homosexuality was 
properly subject to repression or de jure disadvantage reinforced the 
ideology of heterosexuality as both the natural and the normative 
ideal. Judicial reliance on categorical inequality precluded the 
contestation of that ideology. The enforcement of categorical 
inequality through the mechanism of highly deferential rational basis 
review rendered the constitutional validity of heterosexual privilege 
under law virtually inevitable.39 The absence of serious contestation 
allowed the policy choices behind a matrix of heteronormative laws to 
remain disguised as mere artifacts of natural law reasoning. 
Lawrence is thus important less for its explicit protection of a 
private sphere of intimate decisionmaking than for its implicit 
unmasking of the interrelationship between sexuality and the state as 
a properly public sphere. The Court's repudiation of a morality 
justification was the rejection of assumed reasoning, of a rationale that 
need not speak its name. The legitimacy of a basis in morality for 
governmental efforts to control sexuality had been a given.40 Now 
those who would use the state as a mechanism for privileging 
heterosexuality must speak, and in some detail. The ensuing debate is 
likely to reveal the gap between "merely exempt[ing] [homosexual 
conduct] from criminal penalties" and "mak[ing] it 'lawful in the full 
sense.' "41 
The law of adultery provides a good comparison. Laws in twenty­
four states prohibit adultery,42 an offense that did not exist at common 
39. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th 
Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United 
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 
1356-58 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated en bane, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 
1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court's decision in 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), mitigated this effect substantially, but not entirely. See 
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) (distinguishing a Cincinnati charter amendment on the 
ground that it did not affect statewide law and did not sweep as broadly as the Colorado 
state constitutional amendment invalidated in Romer v. Evans); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 
1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998) (distinguishing 
denial of a job as assistant state attorney general to a lesbian attorney on the ground that 
Romer v. Evans dealt with homosexuality as a status or condition, rather than conduct in 
violation of state law). 
40. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion); Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-27 (1968) (specific 
federal policy limits state's power to discourage immorality); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 
949 (11th Cir. 2001). 
41. JEFFREY WEEKS, SEX, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY 
SINCE 1800, at 275 (1981). 
42. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1408-09 (West 
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-501 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 798.01 (2003); GA. 
CODE ANN.§ 16-6-19 (2003); IDAHO CODE§ 18-6601 (Michie 2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/11-7 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3507 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law§ 10-501 
(2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 750.29-.30 (1979); MINN. 
STAT. § 609.36 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 645:3 
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law but arose from the religious and moral beliefs of Europeans who 
settled the American colonies.43 Virtually no prosecutions have 
occurred for the last quarter century, except in cases also involving a 
charge of rape.44 Moreover, the history of adultery law reveals that 
non-prosecution is more than simply desuetude; a longstanding 
ambivalence continues over whether adultery laws should police only 
"open and notorious" conduct so as to prevent public scandal, but 
overlook private infidelity.45 
From the combination of repeal, inapplicability, and disuse, 
criminal laws against adultery have essentially become a dead letter. 
Thus, although one can argue about whether the Court's holding in 
Lawrence requires invalidating them as a constitutional matter, 
prohibitions of adultery have already become functionally irrelevant 
as the basis for direct criminal prosecution. That does not mean, 
however, that adultery has become "lawful in the full sense."46 
Instead, legal regulation of adultery serves many of the same 
functions that sodomy law has served: imposing penalties through the 
operation of civil law, facilitating private discrimination, and 
solidifying social and cultural norms. The state continues to regulate 
adultery in a somewhat ad hoc fashion in multiple venues: through 
employment law,47 family law,48 and tort law.49 In each zone, courts 
(1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-184 (Michie 
2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-20-09 (Michie 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871 
(West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-6-2 (Michie 2002); s.c. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60, -70 
(Law. Co-op. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Michie 
1996); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. § 944.16 (2002). 
43. Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. 
FAM. L. 45, 47-49 (1991-92); Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A 
History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 210, 212-26 (1986). 
44. There are only four reported cases in the last twenty-five years involving criminal 
prosecutions for adultery, in which an allegation of rape was not involved. See State v. 
Mangon, 603 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357 
(Mass. 1983); Van Norman v. State, 365 So. 2d 644 (Miss. 1978); Commonwealth v. 
Papariella, 439 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Press reports exist of other cases. Note, 
Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1672 n.88 (1991); John F. Kelly, Va. Adultery Case Roils Divorce 
Industry, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003, at Bl. Nonetheless, overall direct enforcement appears 
to be minimal, at least outside the military. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76. 
45. See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 150-53 (1951) (discussing Warner v. 
State, 175 N.E. 661 (Ind. 1931), and State v. Chandler, 33 S.W. 797 (Mo. 1896)). Currently, 
statutes in Alabama, Aorida, Illinois, North Carolina and Oklahoma require openness or 
cohabitation. See statutes cited supra note 42. 
46. Knuller, Ltd. v. Dir. of Public Prosecution, 1973 A.C. 435, 457 (1972) (upholding 
conviction for conspiracy to corrupt public morals for publication of gay male personal ads). 
47. See infra text accompanying notes 58-70. 
48. See, e.g., Mabus v. Mabus, No. 2001-CA-00381-SCT, 2003 WL 327669 (Miss. Feb. 13, 
2003); In re Blanchflower, 834 A.2d 1010 (N.H. 2003); R.G.M. v D.E.M., 410 S.E.2d 564 
(S.C. 1991); Shackelford v. Shackelford, 571 S.E.2d 917 (Va. Ct. App. 2002). See generally 
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have analyzed the functions served by various legal principles that 
produce disadvantage for married persons who engage in sexual 
relations with persons other than their spouses. Moral justifications 
have sometimes figured in these decisions;50 Lawrence has rendered 
those justifications insufficient standing alone. But morality accounts 
for only some of a variety of rationales that courts have examined. 
Consider the parallels to sodomy law, especially in the realm of the 
workplace. When gay-rights advocates asserted that sodomy laws 
indirectly created employment-law penalties, they often pointed to a 
series of cases in which openly gay persons were denied jobs in some 
aspect of law enforcement. In these cases, the state agencies argued, 
and prevailed on, a theory that persons who admittedly violated the 
state's sodomy law were not fit to be hired as police officers or state's 
attorneys.51 Robin Shahar, for example, was denied employment as an 
assistant state attorney general in Georgia on the ground that her 
participation in a religious marriage ceremony marked her as someone 
likely to engage in sodomy, then a crime in Georgia, and whose 
presence would create credibility and public perception problems for 
the Attorney General. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Attorney 
General Michael Bowers was justified in rescinding her job offer on 
those grounds.5 2 Ironically, it later came to light that Bowers himself 
had been engaging in an adulterous relationship with a woman who 
worked in his office at the time he refused to hire Shahar.53 
Today, sodomy is no longer a crime in Georgia.54 Adultery, 
however, remains illegal.55 If Bowers (who left office to run for 
governor) were to apply for a job in his old office, would he be barred 
from employment? If Shahar were to re-apply, would she finally get 
JOHN C. MAYONE, BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAW 8 (2d ed. 2003); 
Note, supra note 44. 
49. See, e.g., Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414 (Miss. 1999); Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 
(Utah 1991). See generally Note, supra note 44. 
50. Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics: 
Regulations Banning Sex Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 23-25, 42-44 (2000). 
51. Brief for Petitioners at 42-43, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 
02-102). 
52. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cen. denied, 522 U.S. 
1049 (1998). 
53. Kevin Sack, Georgia Candidate for Governor A dmits A dultery and Resigns 
Commission in Guard, N.Y. nMES, June 6, 1997, at A29. The Eleventh Circuit refused to 
supplement its record by either taking judicial notice of Bowers's admission or by permitting 
further discovery, in part because "we cannot readily say that the result of the case probably 
would be different." Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997). 
54. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the sodomy statute violated the state 
constitution's protection of privacy. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). 
55. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2003). 
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the job? The answers are not as clear as one might think. In an ironic 
result of Lawrence, Bowers seems in the weaker position: unlike 
Shahar, he has admitted to the commission of a crime.56 
In contrast to the near absence of reported decisions in 
prosecutions for adultery, a small but distinct body of jurisprudence 
has arisen from analysis of the proper relationship between sexual 
conduct outside marriage and fitness for public employment. Two U.S. 
Court of Appeals rulings exemplify the uncertainty in this area. These 
decisions, which concern actions taken fifteen years apart, hold that 
government officials enjoy immunity from suits by public employees 
on the ground that there is no clear answer to the question of whether 
the state can regulate private, off-duty sexual behavior.57 
Case law in the Sixth Circuit best illustrates the trajectory of the 
public employment and adultery litigation. Prior to Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the court upheld without opinion a district court decision 
ruling that a police force could not fire a male officer for cohabiting 
with a woman when both were married to someone else.58 Justice 
White dissented from the denial of certiorari in the case, arguing that 
the Supreme Court needed to determine the constitutionality of 
restrictions on adult consensual sexual activity.59 Two years earlier, 
dissenting from denial of review in a similar Fifth Circuit case, Justice 
Brennan noted that "lower courts have divided sharply both in their 
results. and in their analytic approach" to the question, which he 
argued the Court should answer by recognizing a fundamental right.60 
After Hardwick, courts in the Sixth Circuit relied on the 
categorical-inequality principle to rule that no constitutional 
protection attended an intimate adulterous relationship because such 
intimacy cannot be said to be either "deeply rooted in the Nation's 
56. Shahar, however, would not automatically be home free, since Bowers's theory of 
his case in defending her firing was that her religious marriage ceremony signaled her 
violation of Georgia's marriage statute as well as its sodomy law. See 114 F.3d at 1111 
(Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
57. Hughes v. City of N. Olmsted, 93 F.3d 238, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1996) (immunity from 
liability for investigation of whether police officer had "open marriage"); Thorne v. City of 
El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 1986) (immunity from liability for broad inquiry 
into employee's off-duty sexual activities). 
58. City of N. Muskegon v. Briggs, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 
909 (1985). 
59. 473 U.S. at 909-10 (White, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). Justice White's 
recognition that the law was unsettled as to the permissibility of criminal prohibitions on 
consensual adult heterosexual conduct makes his decision in Bowers v. Hardwick even 
stranger. Because the Georgia statute at issue there applied to heterosexual as well as 
homosexual acts, White had the opportunity that he had sought a year earlier to clarify the 
law. Instead, his opinion reads as an anti-gay polemic. 
60. Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 965-66, 971-72 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."61 
One judge, however, argued that the court should examine the facts of 
any given case in light of the factors the Supreme Court identified in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees62 as indicative of an intimate 
association entitled to constitutional protection.63 Those factors 
include depth of emotional attachment, degree of commitment, 
selectivity, and the sharing of "distinctively personal aspects of one's 
life."64 Judge Clay's concurrence provides a good example of the 
alternate meaning of heightened scrutiny that I am using: in the 
process of applying a more stringent standard of review which 
accorded more respect to the plaintiff's adulterous relationship than 
the majority's use of a per se rule, he subjected the relationship to a 
detailed factual examination, eventually concluding that it lacked the 
indicia of intimacy that the Supreme Court had identified in Roberts.65 
One result of Lawrence may be more viable claims of intimate 
association rights by same-sex couples, leading to the same degree of 
judicial inquiry. 
The adultery and public employment cases demonstrate that the 
question of allowable penalty in such cases remains complex. In some 
cases, the public knew of the employee's conduct, raising the question 
of whether it adversely affected the standing of the law-enforcement 
agency with the public.66 Cases also vary as to whether the adulterous 
relationship involved a co-worker67 or the spouse of a co-worker.68 In 
other cases, the relationship concerned persons who had come to the 
attention of the law-enforcement agency because of some link to other 
criminal activity.69 The presence or absence of a criminal prohibition 
61. Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Mercure v. Van 
Buren Township, 81 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Courts outside the Sixth Circuit also 
relied on Hardwick's categorical reasoning. Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 
1482-83 (D. Utah 1995); City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464, 470-72 (Tex. 1996). 
62. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
63. 308 F.3d at 643-46 (Clay, J., concurring). 
64. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'! v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 
546 (1987). 
65. 308 F.3d at 645-46. 
66. Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 
555 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Cook v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 420 S.E.2d 
847 (S.C. 1992); see also Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (librarians). 
67. Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior Coll., 
498 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Wilson, 463 F. Supp. 555 (M.D.N.C. 1978). 
68. City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996). 
69. Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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per se cannot resolve any of the workplace-management problems 
that these scenarios raise.70 
Federal law governing members of the armed services has codified 
these considerations into a set of provisions that function as one 
integrated combination of criminal law and employment code. Articles 
133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice permit 
prosecutions for adultery71 as constituting either "conduct unbecoming 
an officer and a gentleman"72 or an action that is "to the prejudice of 
good order and discipline in the armed forces" or "of a nature to bring 
discredit upon the armed forces."73 By Executive Order in 2002, 
however, President Bush sharply curtailed the effective reach of the 
U.C.M.J. The Bush Executive Order revised the Manual for Courts 
Martial to define prejudice to good order as "conduct that has an 
obvious, and measurably divisive effect on unit or organization 
discipline, morale or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the 
authority or stature of or respect toward a servicemember."74 It further 
limited service-discrediting conduct to that which was "open and 
notorious."75 In addition, the Order specified factors that military 
authorities must consider before initiating a court martial, including 
the respective ranks of the "accused" and the "co-actor," the 
connection, if any, between the spouse(s) and the military, the impact 
on any member's own job performance, and any misuse of 
"government time and resources to facilitate the commission of the 
conduct. "76 
The law of adultery and public employment offers a preview of the 
kinds of inquiries that are likely to arise in judicial scrutiny of 
homosexuality and employment after Lawrence. With the decisive 
effect of criminalization removed, courts will have to ask more, not 
fewer, questions about the nexus between the sexual activity at issue 
and the workplace. One could even imagine the open and notorious 
70. Some cases arose in jurisdictions without a criminal prohibition of adultery. 
Hollenbaugh, 439 U.S. at 1057 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Marcum v. 
McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 642 (6th Cir. 2002). 
71. C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters But Should Marriage?: Adultery, Fratenerization, 
and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 213-34 (1999); see, e.g., United States 
v. Kroop, 38 M.J. 470 (C.M.A. 1993); United States v. Frazier, 34 M.J. 194 (C.M.A. 1992). 
72. 10 u.s.c. § 933 (2000). 
73. 10 u.s.c. § 934 (2000). 
74. Exec. Order No. 13262, 3 C.F.R. 210 (2003), (amending Exec. Order No. 12473, 3 
C.F.R. 201 (1985)). The Executive Order partially implements one of the recommendations 
of a panel sponsored by the National Institute for Military Justice, which recommended full 
decriminalization of both adultery and sodomy. Report of the Commission on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (May 2001), at 
www .badc.orglhtml/militarylaw _cox.html. 
75. 3 C.F.R. at 217. 
76. Id. 
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standard from the Bush Executive Order on adultery replacing the 
military's Don't Ask Don't Tell policy. 
Just as civil penalties for sexual harassment have led to the 
generation of hundreds of judicial narratives about the details of 
sexual interactions in the workforce, the need to regulate how 
employers can or cannot take sexual orientation into consideration 
will intensify the law's discourse on homosexuality. Indeed, with the 
Supreme Court's ruling that same-sex sexual harassment can be 
actionable if the discriminatory conduct occurred because of the sex of 
the person harassed,77 the process of examining harassment with 
homosexual overtones has already begun. In its opinion, the Court 
was careful to specify an exemption for "intersexual flirtation" from 
the zone of objectionable activity,78 leaving lower courts to infer that 
same-sex flirtation might be judged differently. One court has noted 
that it "cannot rule out that the homosexual aspect of harassment 
could objectively contribute [to] a hostile environment."79 
Ill. CONTAINMENT AND COMPLEXITY 
As is true in both the adultery employment law cases and the 
earliest round of post-Lawrence sexual orientation cases, courts 
provide a central institutional venue for negotiating the role of 
sexuality in the public sphere. Even the autonomy claims specifically 
denominated as privacy and associated with contraception and 
abortion always spilled outside the private sphere. Efforts to establish 
the public presence of birth control clinics, not any real threat of 
police in the bedroom, triggered the series of lawsuits eventually 
resulting in Griswold v. Connecticut and the Supreme Court's 
recognition of privacy as a component of substantive due process.80 
Lawrence secures the right to seclusion and shelter for sexual 
intimacy, but its impact on full sexual autonomy beyond the operation 
of criminal law is much less clear. 
The question of social legitimacy marks the cultural fault line for 
homosexuality, the point at which political eruptions occur. Given the 
intensity of debates over such issues as marriage, it seems unlikely that 
genuine, consistent moral neutrality will characterize social and legal 
77. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
78. Id. at 81. 
79. Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 712-13 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). All of the Connecticut litigation grew from the closure of birth 
control clinics in 1940. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY & SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE v. WADE 60-72 (1994). Two federal court challenges 
prior to Griswold were dismissed on standing and ripeness grounds: Tileston v. Ullman, 318 
U.S. 44 (1943), and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). For an early (and critical) 
observation of the problems with the term "privacy, " see Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain 
Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173. 
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practices related to homosexuality in the near future. Rather, deprived 
of criminal law as a tool, opponents of equality for lesbians and gay 
men are likely to concentrate increasingly on the strategy of 
containment. 
The effort to contain homosexuality and even an explicit 
comparison to communicable disease is not new; even before AIDS, 
the metaphor of disease was used to defend sodomy laws.8 1 
Containment now buttresses a kinder, gentler hierarchy, but one that 
courts nonetheless continuously modernize by refining the rationales 
for antigay bigotry.82 Much of the current debate about homosexuality 
appears grounded in beliefs in fair treatment for lesbian and gay 
Americans that co-exist with beliefs in the superiority of 
heterosexuality.83 In this atmosphere, public policy disputes are likely 
to center on the proper degree of containment necessary for what is 
perceived to be the homosexual menace to public culture. Drawing on 
archetypes of danger long associated with homosexuality,84 three 
themes or discursive fields are likely to emerge as the primary arenas 
for regulation and scrutiny: situation-specific disputes involving 
children or the control of expressive space; the rank ordering of same­
sex relationships into legal hierarchies; and containment by analogy. 
A. Situation-Specific Containment 
1. Children 
Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family 
Services85 and State v. Limon86 both illustrate the power of 
containment arguments in contexts involving children. Both cases 
reflect the mixture of pre- and post-Lawrence paradigms at work in 
81. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.). 
82. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE 
LAW 1177-78 (2d ed. 2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation 
of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 
(2000). 
83. Charles Lane, Polls: Americans Say Court Is "About Right," WASH. POST, July 7, 
2003, at A15; James Ricci & Patricia Ward Bierderman, Acceptance of Gays on Rise, Polls 
Show, L.A. nMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at Bl; Katharine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Strong Support 
is Found for Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al. 
84. Larry Cata Backer has described how decades of case law prior to Lawrence helped 
to construct the image of gay men as seducers of youth, sexually promiscuous, defilers of 
public space, and predators. Larry Cata Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for 
Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and 
British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 529 (1996); see also Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as 
Contagion: From The Well of Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401 (2000) 
(tracing the history of the contagion and identity models of homosexuality). 
85. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
86. 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). 
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particularly vivid ways, because both were structured and litigated at 
the trial court level and through initial appeals prior to the Court's 
decision in Lawrence. Limon was pending before the Supreme Court 
on a petition for certiorari when Lawrence was decided; the Court 
remanded so that the Kansas Court of Appeals could reconsider its 
earlier decision upholding differential sentencing in light of 
Lawrence. s7 The Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in Lofton 
before the Lawrence opinion issued, and received supplemental briefs 
from the parties afterward.ss Thus, in both cases, the parties and the 
court had to adjust when Bowers v. Hardwick was overruled. 
Limon involved consensual oral sex between two males, fourteen­
and eighteen-years-old, both residents in a facility for the 
developmentally disabled. Kansas criminalized same-sex sodomy at 
the time, but, in this instance, had one participant been female, there 
still would have been a prosecutable offense, because the law 
presumed the fourteen-year-old could not consent. The statute 
governing sentencing created a special category, however, when two 
opposite-sex participants were less than four years apart in age. Under 
that statute, Matthew Limon would have received a sentence of 
thirteen to fifteen months in prison had the other party been female. 
Instead, because the "Romeo and Juliet" provision explicitly excluded 
same-sex partners, he received a sentence of seventeen years and two 
months.s9 
The Lofton plaintiffs challenged a Florida statute that prohibited 
adoption by persons "known to engage in current, voluntary 
homosexual activity," then illegal under that state's sodomy law.90 
Florida allowed both married couples and single heterosexuals to 
adopt children.91 The plaintiffs included gay foster parents and legal 
guardians who sought to adopt the children for whom they had been 
caring.92 
Prior to Lawrence, attorneys for Kansas had defended its statute 
by arguing the categorical principle of Hardwick: if the state could 
constitutionally criminalize homosexual sexual behavior, it could also 
impose differential punishment upon persons who engaged in that 
behavior.93 Attorneys for Florida had invoked morality as a rational 
87. Limon v. Kansas, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003). 
88. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809. 
89. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). 
90. The statute states, "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that 
person is a homosexual." FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003). Courts subsequently developed 
the definition of "homosexual." See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807. 
91. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(2)(a)-(b) (2003). 
92. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807-08. 
93. Limon, 83 P.3d at 244 (Pierron, J., dissenting). 
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basis for differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.94 
Despite Lawrence, neither state relinquished a morality claim,95 and 
both courts accepted the goal of shielding children from exposure to 
homosexuality as a legitimate substitute for the morality argument 
rejected in Lawrence. 
The Eleventh Circuit buried the state's earlier justification of 
morality in a footnote as if it had never been significant,96 and found 
that the state could rationally conclude that the "presence of both 
male and female authority figures [was] critical to optimal childhood 
development and socialization."97 As the reason for why that 
statement would be true, the court stated that "heterosexual singles, 
even if they never marry, are better positioned than homosexual 
individuals to provide adopted children with education and guidance 
relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence and 
adolescence. "98 On this reasoning, homosexuality intrinsically presents 
possible harm to children, and the state in exercise of its solemn duty 
to protect children in its care, can act to prevent that harm from 
occurring. 
On a six to six vote, the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing en 
banc.99 Dissenting from that order, Judge Barkett argued that the 
court should not assume that such harm would occur, and complained 
that "the panel never explains why it is rational to believe that 
homosexuals, as a class, are unable to provide stable homes and 
appropriate role models for children."100 Judge Birch, in his special 
concurrence, sought to answer: "[T]he mainstream of contemporary 
American family life consists of heterosexual individuals. Can it 
seriously be contended that an arguably rational basis does not exist 
for placing adoptive children in the mainstream of American family 
life?"101 Judge Birch's response still fails to furnish an explanation, but 
as the exchange framed here by Judges Barkett and Birch continues, 
either in this case or in future cases, the arguments are likely to grow 
more specific. 
94. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 1372, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Brief of Appellees at 
41-47, Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 
2004) (No. 01-16723). 
95. Appellee's Brief on Rehearing at 15-20, State v. Limon, 32 Kan. App. 2d 369 
(2004) (No. 00-85898-A); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs. , 358 F.3d 
at 819 n.17; Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1278 
(11th Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
96. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819 n.17. 
97. Id. at 818. 
98. Id. at 822. 
99. 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). 
100. 377 F.3d at 1298. 
101. Id. at 1276. 
June 2004] Sexual Orientation and Heightened Scrutiny 1545 
In Limon, containment functioned as the basis for upholding the 
sentencing differential, literally for the justice who wrote the primary 
opinion and metaphorically for the concurring justice. Justice Green, 
writing for the court, is a Lawrence resister: he refuses to surrender 
morality as a basis for imprisonment. Among the variety of rationales 
he offered to explain why the legislature would impose such a 
draconian differential, Justice Green included "to prevent the gradual 
deterioration of the sexual morality approved by a majority of 
Kansans."102 Justice Malone, concurring, demurred from following that 
path, but accepted that it would be reasonable for the legislature to 
protect children from the "increased health risks associated with 
homosexual activity until they are old enough to be more certain of 
their choice."103 Remarkably, he found this reason persuasive despite 
his acknowledgment that no increased health risks ensue when the 
participants in a homosexual act are female.104 
We expect adults to protect themselves from pernicious influences 
and obvious dangers, but society steps in to protect children when 
necessary. Both Lofton and Limon involved minors in the custody of 
the state, eliminating any potential conflict between state and parent. 
Even before Lawrence, an overwhelming shift in family law had 
resulted in the protection of the custody and visitation rights of gay 
parents and even the institutionalization of two-parent adoption by 
gay couples. In jurisdictions where that has not occurred, however, the 
future battles will center on arguments of containment in the form of 
protecting children from the harmful effects of exposure to 
homosexuality. 
2. Expressive Space 
Geography created an important limiting principle in Lawrence by 
specifying a key spatial dimension - private space - to the liberty 
being protected. 1 05 The opposite spatial dimension - public space, 
with its openness to representation and advocacy - presents a 
different critical question for the law: to what extent, if any, can the 
state regulate public culture, where exposure to homosexuality is most 
likely and thus containment arguably most urgently needed? 
Sexual speech of any sort has led to the First Amendment anomaly 
of courts according public speech less protection than private speech, 
and allowing the government to zone explicit representation into 
102 Limon, 83 P.3d at 236. 
103. Id. at 242 (Malone, J., concurring). 
104. Id. 
105. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484. 
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certain locations and out of others.106 So we begin from the proposition 
that sexual speech is different from and less valued under the law than 
other speech. Will homosexual sexual speech be more different still, 
accorded less protection than heterosexual sexual speech? And could 
that possibly be true now, even if such a differential was permissible 
prior to Lawrence? Put another way, if homosexual conduct is legal, 
how could homosexual speech be penalized?107 
Some limits on when gay speech can be suppressed are clear. At 
least the second half of "don't ask, don't tell" used to be the cultural 
norm, but is no longer; media representations of homosexuality and 
out gay people are comrnonplace.108 A partial exception to this persists 
in schools, where the degree of openness is largely left to 
administrative discretion, 109 and in electronic and interactive media, 
where courts await maturation of filtering and other technologies that 
facilitate parental control.110 
Propositioning an adult of the same sex in a public space to engage 
in conduct in a private space ought to be insulated from prosecution 
because it is a solicitation to commit a lawful act. However, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal stated in 1995 in a case involving 
two men that solicitation even for private lawful conduct could be 
prosecuted: "the solicitation of some sexual acts is simply not 
appropriate in public places. To suggest that government cannot 
prohibit such solicitation is unfathomable."111 No Oklahoma court has 
yet ruled on whether this dicta will survive Lawrence, but the court's 
reasoning indicates that the distinction between public and private 
space remains a viable one in First Amendment jurisprudence on 
sexual speech. 
Insofar as explicit representation is concerned, the law is 
thoroughly muddled and likely to remain so. In this area, the law, like 
the imagery, is unruly; cases involve varying degrees of erotic content, 
106. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
107. I do not address issues related to the military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, which 
is now more vulnerable under a First Amendment analysis. 
108. See generally SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, ALL THE RAGE: THE STORY OF GAY 
VISIBILITY IN AMERICA (2001). 
109. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en 
bane) (upholding transfer of teaching for violating policy against presenting "controversial 
materials" to students); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 
1995) (finding that mandatory AIDS awareness assembly did not create hostile 
environment). 
110. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) (affirming injunction against federal 
Child Online Protection Act); United States v. American Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297 
(2003) (upholding requirement that public library install filters on computers in order to 
qualify for federal funds). 
111. Sawatzky v. City of Oklahoma City, 906 P.2d 785, 787 n.7 (1995). 
June 2004] Sexual Orientation and Heightened Scrutiny 1547 
in contexts ranging from health education1 12 to high art1 13 to unadorned 
commerce. At least as a matter of law, the elimination of sodomy 
statutes will not change much, and Lawrence is unlikely to prevent 
wide discrepancies in the law affecting containment of homosexual 
imagery in public space. 
Most public space containment cases still involve an older 
discursive theme of the uniquely offensive character of homosexual 
expression, but a more modern theme also exists, that of suppressing 
gay speech to prevent disruption or even violence. The military's don't 
ask, don't tell policy is founded on this argument, expressed as the unit 
cohesion rationale,1 14  and examples of it exist outside that institution 
as well.115 
B. Containment by Hierarchy 
The rhetoric of respect for gay relationships in Lawrence, 
combined with a myriad of other forms of legal recognition for same­
sex couples, signals that the period when such couples were treated as 
strangers under the law is over. Even states with sodomy laws that 
were in effect up until the Court's decision in Lawrence contained 
municipalities that recognized gay couples for some purposes.116 
Indeed, current debate over relationships centers on what, until 
112. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc. , 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995); Gay Men's 
Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (invalidating CDC policies 
regarding AIDS educational materials as contrary to statutory standard and void for 
vagueness); Rees v. State, 909 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding obscenity 
conviction for showing film of sex acts between men on public access cable sex information 
program). 
113. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding 
statutory requirement that NEA consider "general standards of decency" in making grant 
awards). 
1 14. See, e.g. , Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 
115. The same rationale of treating men's sexual solicitation of other men as 
constituting provocation of violence lay behind acceptance of the "gay panic" defense. See 
Joshua Dressler, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on 
Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 754-56 (1995); Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation's Privileged 
Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, "Homosexual Panic," and the Non-Violent Unwanted 
Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 195 (2000). Ohio recently reversed 
case law in which same-sex solicitation was criminalized under a "fighting words" rationale, 
on the theory that a person might respond to such a solicitation with violence. State v. 
Thompson, 767 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio 2002). 
1 16. Local jurisdictions in Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina and Texas offered 
domestic partner health benefits to lesbian and gay public employees at the time that 
Lawrence was decided. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, THE STATE OF THE 
WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 2002, at 13 
tbl. 3 (2002), available at http://www.hrc.org. Each of those states had a sodomy statute 
which was invalidated by the Court's decision. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 82, at 
76-78. 
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recently, seemed the radical question of whether laws limiting 
marriage to heterosexuals can be justified. 
As an institution, however, marriage stands for nothing if not 
containment, and specifically containment of sexuality. On that point, 
both the majority and the dissent in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health,117 for example, agree. The majority opinion essentially 
substitutes the exclusive commitment of monogamy for the different 
sexes of the partners as the very definition of marriage, repeatedly 
drawing on exclusivity as the sine qua non of marriage.U8 Justice 
Cordy in dissent accepted that principle, although he put it to different 
use: "[p ]aramount among its many important functions, the institution 
of marriage has systematically provided for the regulation of 
heterosexual behavior [and) brought order to the resulting 
procreation . . . .  The partners in a marriage are expected to engage in 
exclusive sexual relations, with children the probable result and 
paternity presumed."1 19 
If Justice Scalia saw with horror an openness to same-sex marriage 
creeping into the logic of the Kennedy and O'Connor opinions in 
Lawrence, despite the implicit or explicit disavowals of both authors, 120 
others view the prospect of marital structures for same-sex 
relationships with alarm for very different reasons. From the 
perspective of queer legal theory, Lawrence provides both an overdue 
correction and a new set of problems. To achieve the correction, the 
Court performed the regulatory function that Gayle Rubin identified 
more than twenty years ago: the Justices drew the line of social 
acceptance at a new point in the hierarchy of sexual identities, 
accepting the most conventional same-sex couples into the realm of 
"respect," but potentially further isolating those whose lives place 
them in the regions of disrepute on the wrong side of the line.121 Or, to 
translate into my model, the Court tore down an old wall of 
containment and built a new one. 
117. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
118. Id. at 961 ("[I]t is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage 
partners to one another . . .  that is the sine qua non of civil marriage."); id. at 969 ("We 
construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the 
exclusion of all others."); id. at 948-49 (defining marriage as "[t]he exclusive commitment of 
two individuals to each other" and an "intimate, exclusive union"); id. at 965 (noting 
"marriage's solemn obligation[] of exclusivity"); id. at 969 (maintaining that "the aim of 
marriage [is] to promote stable, exclusive relationships"). 
119. Id. at 995. 
120. 123 S. Ct. at 2478 ("whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law"); see 
also id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that legitimate state interests would 
include "preserving the traditional institution of marriage"). 
121. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, 
in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 282 (Carole S. Vance 
ed., 1984). 
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Professors Kendall Thomas122 and Teemu Ruskola123 adopt Janet 
Halley's critique of the Hardwick opinion as equally applicable to 
Lawrence: "heterosexual identity is the location from which the 
Justices decide the case without appearing to."124 Both argue that the 
Court's language seeks to subsume gay sex into the norms of 
domestication associated with marriage, as in the Court's statement 
that "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in 
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, 
just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse."125 The question this 
portion of the opinion leaves begging is whether private consensual 
sexual acts should be protected, independently of relationships. As 
Ruskola notes, "sex need not be about connection at all; sex can 
signify intense alienation and separation as much as connection."126 
The re-mapping of sexual respectability evident in the text of 
Lawrence creates the third major site for contests over containment. 
Lawrence skirts this issue. The ambiguity of the Court's meaning is 
reflected in its statement that "intimate conduct with another 
person . . . can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring."127 Queer theorists fear that this statement will be read with 
particular emphasis, as meaning that intimate conduct with another 
person can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring. Their concern is that long-term commitment will become a 
prerequisite in future judicial interpretations of the scope of liberty 
that Lawrence recognizes. 
Whether their language was euphemistic or precise, past Justices 
have framed sexual rights in relational terms. All told, prior to 
Lawrence, three Justices of the Supreme Court wrote opinions arguing 
that private adult consensual conduct should be treated as a 
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. The earliest, Justice 
Marshall's, concerned a heterosexual couple fired from their jobs in a 
public library because of their open cohabitation.128 Justice Marshall 
122. Kendall Thomas, Our Brown? Reading Lawrence v. Texas (unpublished 
manuscript). 
123. Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights vs. Queer Theory: What Is Left of Sodomy After 
Lawrence v. Texas (March 27, 2004) (unpublished manuscript). 
124. Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1767 (1993). Katherine Franke critiques the case on similar 
grounds. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 CO LUM. 
L. REV. 1399 (2004). 
125. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
126. Ruskola, supra note 123, at 17. 
127. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. 
128. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J.,  
dissenting from denial of cert.). 
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framed the issue as their "rights to pursue an open rather than a 
clandestine personal relationship" and their "choice of living 
arrangements for themselves and their child."129 Justice Brennan, also 
addressing two heterosexual public employees fired because of their 
relationship, framed the fundamental right as encompassing "a broad 
range of private choices involving family life and personal 
autonomy."130 Lastly, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. 
Hardwick spoke of "the fundamental interest all individuals have in 
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others,"131 
associations that "form so central a part of an individual's life."132 
However, the Court in Lawrence cited none of these opinions. 
Nowhere in the record before the Court was there any indication 
that the parties in Lawrence had "an enduring personal bond. "133 
There was thus no basis for the Court to condition the full protection 
of liberty on the existence of such a relationship. My contention, 
therefore, is that the sentence will be read with a different emphasis, 
as meaning that intimate conduct can be but one element in a personal 
bond . . .  or not; there is no necessary connection between the two. On 
this reading, the liberty protection attaches to the intimate conduct in 
a way that covers all that Lawrence purports to protect: consensual, 
non-commercial, adult sexual conduct occurring in physically 
sequestered locations. Moreover, this reading is consistent with the 
Court's declaration that "it is the right of the individual, married or 
single" to choose to engage in heterosexual conduct without fear of 
129. Id. at 1055-56. 
130. Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.). 
131. 478 U.S. at 206. 
132. Id. at 204. 
133. Because Lawrence and Garner entered pleas of nolo contender, the record from 
the lower courts contained no description of the circumstances of their encounter. Lawrence 
v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (en bane). The silence of the record has not 
impeded the commentary, however. Larry Tribe notes that "[a]pparently, [the relationship 
between Lawrence and Garner] was quite fleeting, lasting only one night and lacking any 
semblance of permanence or exclusivity." Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
"Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 (2004). 
Tribe reads Lawrence - and the "but one element" sentence specifically - as founded on a 
recognition of the value of relationships and a presumption against allowing governmental 
intrusion into deeply personal connections, a presumption that he describes the Court as 
"unflinchingly applying . . . despite the seemingly casual character of the encounter 
involved," because to have done otherwise would have "ceded to the state the power to 
determine what count as meaningful relationships." Id. at 1905. In a diametrically opposite 
reading of that same sentence, Katherine Franke asserts that "the Court took it as a given 
that Lawrence and Garner were in a relationship, and the fact of that relationship does 
important normative work in the opinion," i.e., "thorough[ly] . . .  domesticating John 
Lawrence and Tyron Garner." Franke, supra note 124, at 1408. My own understanding of 
the facts, based on hearsay, is the same as Tribe's. 
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pregnancy.134 Any further hierarchic ranking within the category of 
sexual conduct would raise suspicions of morals-driven selection 
criteria. Morally neutral considerations - such as the impact of 
certain couples in a particular workplace - might legitimately lead to 
regulatory interventions. If that assessment is to be genuinely neutral, 
however, couplehood will not be a precondition for protection of 
liberty. 
C. Containment by Analogy 
Despite the significant body of law which has arisen addressing the 
relationship between sexuality and the state, a conceptual muddiness 
remains at the core of our understanding of that relationship. Law 
operates by analogy, and a multi-faceted analogy problem bedevils the 
law of sexuality. 
Sodomy law sought to regulate both acts and identities. In 
Hardwick, the Court had before it a statute which prohibited acts, by 
whomever committed, but the Court's opinion created a judicial test 
which focused on identities.U5 In Lawrence, the Court created a test 
which integrated the two, while also recognizing the ways in which the 
target for direct legal control had shifted over time from acts to 
identities, leading to a confusion between the two.136 Even as the 
Court made its integrative move, however, the confines of legal 
doctrine forced it to choose between the two doctrinal handles 
presented by the petitioners - due process and equal protection - to 
provide the basis for its decision.137 Thus, one central analogic problem 
is whether principles of liberty or equality most closely fit the question 
of how law should conceptualize the rights of lesbians and gay men. 
Within the equality framework, the second question of analogy 
becomes how to compare classifications based on sexual orientation to 
other group-based classifications. Disputes over race generated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and continue to serve as the central paradigm 
for all equal protection questions. Whether or to what extent sexual 
orientation can be compared to race has produced its own body of 
academic commentary,138 now joined by debates over whether sex139 or 
134. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
135. 478 U.S. at 188 n.1, 192, 196. 
136. 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80. 
137. See id. at 2482. 
138. See, e.g. , Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of 
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115 (David Kairys 
ed., 3d ed. 1998); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1467 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, 
Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000); Sharon 
Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies - Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual 
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religion140 might furnish a closer comparison to sexual orientation. 
That debate has not reached the Supreme Court, however. The Court 
has assiduously avoided the question of classification analogy, opting 
instead for the default mechanism of rational basis review, 
supplemented by a higher standard for rationality, for sexual 
orientation classifications, as was evident in Romer v. Evans, now 
clarified by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence.141 
Nor do liberty and equality exhaust the field of doctrinal 
possibilities. To a much greater extent than in prior civil rights 
movements, expression and voice form a key component of gay rights 
struggles. Coming out creates the stigmatized identity. Thus the 
doctrinal basis for the protection of coming-out speech - the First 
Amendment - plays a fundamental role in questions of either 
autonomy or equality for gay people.142 
Lawrence offers no guidance on any of these aspects of analogy 
appropriateness and appropriation. Perhaps over time, one of the 
foregoing themes or doctrines will come to dominate in the law of 
sexual orientation. In the meantime, analogic confusion is likely to 
continue. 
There is a bright side to the analogy problem, however: uncertainty 
can operate as positive openness and not merely as avoidance. 
Declining to specify an analogy for sexual orientation carries the 
political advantage of judicial minimalism, postponing closure on a 
divisive social issue until the political branches are more uniformly 
Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETIER L.J. 65 (1997); Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay 
and Bisexual Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33 (1994). 
139. A number of articles examine the analogy between sex and sexual orientation 
discrimination, but most of the arguments are captured by a recent exchange: Edward Stein, 
Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
471 (2001) and Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). 
In the Texas state courts, Lawrence and Garner relied on the state's Equal Rights 
Amendment to argue that because the sodomy statute criminalized certain conduct only if 
the two persons were of the same sex, proof of defendants' sex was a necessary element of 
the crime, an example of per se discrimination. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 
2001) (en bane). In the Supreme Court, counsel for the two men elected to forego the sex 
discrimination argument entirely, although it could have been used as an alternative basis for 
arguing a violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for Petitioners, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102). Bypassing sex discrimination 
allowed the attorneys to avoid a line of argument that would have been far more difficult to 
distinguish from challenges to marriage statutes, since all exclusionary marriage laws utilize 
the same distinction based on sex of partners that the Texas sodomy law embodied. 
140. The most forceful argument that religion furnishes the closest comparison to sexual 
orientation is DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE, 
GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES (1999). 
141. 123 S. Ct. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
142. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 82, at 321-70; Nan D. Hunter, Expressive 
Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
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aligned on the illegitimacy of antigay bias. Moreover, although the 
logic of legal argument will press both advocates and courts to identify 
and elaborate analogy more clearly, not pinning down the closest 
comparison may prove the most liberating move in the long run, as 
well as a politically pragmatic move in the short run. 
There is no intrinsic, ahistorical best doctrine for sexual 
orientation. Of course, "best" could be defined as most powerful in 
ending oppression or as least disruptive of the social order or in any 
number of other ways. But even if one accepts that "best" should 
mean most efficacious in equalizing the power relationship between 
the majority and the socially subordinate group, there is no always 
right answer. Many women's rights advocates chafed at the language 
in Roe v. Wade which grounded the right to choose abortion as much 
with the physician as with the pregnant woman, and it became a 
common argument that the decision would have been far more 
powerful had it been based on sex equality, rather than due process 
privacy, grounds.143 Ironically, however, in Lawrence v. Texas, most 
observers have understood the equal protection claim to be weaker 
than the due process claim. 144 Had winning on due process not 
necessarily entailed the reversal of Hardwick, however, the opposite 
perception of Lawrence might well have dominated. 
With the onus of Hardwick removed, one can at least imagine 
examinations of the regulation of homosexuality that could step 
beyond the group-based focus and substitute a model of analysis built 
on the understanding that classifications emerge from structures and 
systems of subordination. A shortcoming of analogy disputes is that 
they tend to produce simplistic models of hierarchy. In the field of sex 
discrimination, for example, courts have framed the question of 
whether a practice discriminates based on sex as synonymous with the 
question of whether it discriminates against women, or perhaps 
against men.145 Framing the question in that way, rather than as a 
broader interrogation of gender, precludes the strongest modes of 
anti-subordination argument. 
Using a focus on structures of subordination would direct attention 
to a broad range of ideologies of superiority, prevailing cultural and 
social norms, and material consequences of oppressive practices. An 
143. See, e.g. , Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1621-45 (1979). 
144. See Tribe, supra note 133, at 1907-16. 
145. The lower court in Lawrence used this argument as part of the basis for its ruling 
that the Texas Equal Rights Amendment did not apply. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 
359 (finding that the sodomy law produced no "disparate impact between men and 
women"). 
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expansive notion of full citizenship turns on freedom from all such 
systems of social control. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Lawrence v. Texas marked a dramatic milestone in efforts to limit 
state power to control homosexuality, but the product is likely to be a 
different regulatory regime rather than a libertarian utopia (or 
dystopia, depending on one's perspective). Law long ago ceased to be 
effective in prohibiting consensual conduct, and has instead functioned 
as a critically important venue for multiplying the discourses of 
sexuality. Under the regime of Lawrence, courts will continue to 
operate as mediating institutions, adjudicating the contest between 
equality demands and efforts at containment. 
